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This article examines whether the introduction of gender quotas has increased inequality in 
terms of individual campaign spending between female and male parliamentary candidates. 
Based on the analysis of official campaign declarations by 10,436 candidates, we examine how 
the individual election campaign expenses of female and male candidates have changed over 
nine consecutive federal and regional elections in Belgium (1991-2014). Earlier research on 
the link between gender and campaign finance in proportional electoral systems suggests that 
female expenses are significantly lower than male expenses (Engeli and Lutz 2014; Maddens, 
Weekers, and Noppe 2006; Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 2010). In this contribution, we 
explain these differences and examine how they are related to the introduction of quota 
regulations in the case of the Belgian flexible-list PR system. 
 
Over recent decades, various measures have been taken to improve the representation of 
women in political institutions (Krook 2007; Krook and Norris 2014). Quota regulations have 
been introduced in several countries, which, in interaction with other initiatives, successfully 
increased the presence of female MPs in parliaments (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2010; Tripp 
and Kang 2008). At the same time, however, women still remain underrepresented in the 
political arena. Quotas did not lead to perfect gender parity in parliaments.1 
                                                 
1 See the website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, with comparative data by country and world and 




If we want to explain the persistence of gender inequality in the political and electoral arena, it 
is relevant to go beyond the mere analysis of the number of elected women (Franceschet, 
Krook, and Piscopo 2012), and to evaluate the effects of gender quotas in accordance with 
other aspects of the electoral process, among others political finance and campaign spending 
behavior. This article does so by addressing the following research question: is the introduction 
of gender quotas associated with a gender gap in campaign spending? The imposition of 
legislative quota regulations on political parties in Belgium led to a sudden surge in the 
presence of women candidates on party lists. Earlier research shows that, initially, these new 
candidates were politically inexperienced and less supported by party elites (Wauters, Weekers, 
and Maddens 2010). After a couple of elections, however, differences in terms of list positions 
between female and male candidates decreased.  
 
 We expect that the introduction of quota regulations leads to unequal individual campaign 
spending between female and male parliamentary candidates. This inequality would in turn 
deteriorate women's political prospects, since individual campaign spending efforts affect 
candidates' personal election outcomes. Previous research has demonstrated that candidates 
spending more on their campaigns generally receive more votes (Abramowitz 1991; Samuels 
2001). Even in flexible-list systems, where ballot rank is the decisive factor in intra-party seat 
allocation, candidates are incentivized to run personalized election campaigns with individual 
campaign expenses (Bräuninger, Brunner, and Daübler 2012). Crisp et al. (2013) demonstrate 
that, despite a lack of clear structural incentives to cultivate personal votes in flexible-list 
systems, candidates with high numbers of preferential votes are rewarded with better ballot 
positions in future elections. As a consequence, if the introduction of quota regulations indeed 
leads to spending inequality among male and female candidates, this will generate significant 
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differences in terms of preferential votes and create a structural disadvantage for women on 
party lists in this relatively popular electoral system. 
 
In an effort to tackle this puzzle, we focus on the Belgian case where legislative quota 
regulations have been introduced in three consecutive steps since the second half of the 1990s. 
We examine whether a gender gap existed regarding the amount of campaign expenses and 
whether the evolution in this gender gap coincides with the introduction of Belgian quota laws. 
Given the gradual and stepwise introduction of these quota laws, we believe Belgium is an 
interesting case to assess the effects of gender quota regulations on the campaign spending 
behavior of male and female candidates in flexible-list PR systems.  
 
The next section first presents a more extensive discussion of earlier literature on gender effects 
in campaign finance. Afterwards, we elaborate on how the introduction of quota regulations 
affects campaign spending and through which mechanism gender inequality in spending 
disadvantages female candidates in flexible-list PR systems. This will lead us to formulate a 
number of testable hypotheses. We then turn to the case of Belgium and discuss the nature of 
its flexible-list PR electoral system, quota laws and campaign finance regulations. After 
presenting the collected data and methods, we discuss the results of the empirical analysis. The 
conclusion puts the main findings in theoretical perspective and discusses generalizability 
beyond the Belgian case to similar electoral systems. 
 
The link between gender and campaign finance 
 
Most research on the relationship between gender and campaign finance has focused on 
majoritarian electoral systems. While some scholars claim that women candidates are less able 
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to attract financial support for their election campaigns (Jenkins 2007; Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, 
and Walsh 2009), others expect a gender gap with regard to actual campaign spending (Hogan 
2007). However, empirical studies show that gender does not have a significant effect on 
candidates’ fundraising skills and capacities (Adams and Schreiber 2010; Werner 1997), nor 
on their campaign spending levels (Hogan 2007).  
 
The scarce research on proportional electoral systems, on the other hand, presents a different 
story. Engeli and Lutz (2014) analysed two Swiss lower house elections and show that the level 
of campaign spending for male candidates was significantly higher than for female candidates. 
Studies on the Belgian case found similar effects of gender on campaign expenses (Maddens, 
Weekers, and Noppe 2006; Wauters, Weekers, and Maddens 2010).  
 
Why should we expect such a link between gender and campaign finance? Scholars often refer 
to the ‘sacrificial lambs’ hypothesis as the underlying mechanism explaining a possible gender 
effect in this regard. The argument mainly pertains to differences in candidate expectations and 
motivations in majoritarian electoral systems (Bernstein 1986; Burrell 1992): although party 
elites encourage women to participate in elections and nominate them accordingly, female 
candidates would only be allowed to run for non-winnable seats. This disincentivizes women 
candidates to engage in fundraising activities and to run expensive election campaigns. Yet 
again there is no empirical support for this claim in majoritarian systems (Palmer and Dimon 
2001; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). 
 
In proportional electoral systems, however, the sacrificial lamb hypothesis might still have its 
applicability. Political parties in these systems are expected to draft lists of candidates for 
parliamentary office. Self-evidently, not every list position provides realistic chances of 
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winning a seat (Hazan and Rahat 2010), and candidates in unrealistic list positions will be less 
motivated to invest in expensive campaigns. Especially in list PR systems where rank order 
plays a decisive role in intraparty seat allocation, the upper or realistic list positions can be 
considered the equivalent of winnable seats in majoritarian systems, and candidates in 
unrealistic positions can be expected to spend significantly lower amounts during campaigns.  
 
In these electoral systems, it can be argued that if women are systematically overrepresented 
amongst lower positioned candidates, then they will become demotivated to run individual 
election campaigns. If women, on the contrary, would get equally assigned to realistic positions 
on party lists as men, they will be inclined to match the campaign expenses of their co-partisans. 
In many countries, the introduction of gender quotas strongly affected the incidence of female 
candidates on upper list positions (Krook 2007).  
 
 
How quotas affect the gender gap in campaign spending: arguments and hypotheses 
 
We argue that the introduction of gender quotas substantially affects the gender gap in 
campaign spending as a result of a conflict between the predominantly male party elite and the 
group of women candidates (Niven 1998; Tremblay and Pelletier 2001). The male party elites 
will initially perceive new female candidates in terms of stereotypes and consider them as 
having less political capabilities (Meier 2008). As important political institutions (i.e. parties, 
parliaments and governments) are strongly dominated by men, the perception arises that men 
are more likely to be politically successful than women. When confronted with new quota 
regulations, party elites will therefore not be inclined to grant female candidates realistic list 
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positions, believing that male candidates will be more successful and attract more votes and 
support. 
 
We thus expect that women receive unrealistic list positions and that their candidacy will not 
be equally supported by the party elite immediately after the initial introduction of quotas. 
Moreover, these inexperienced female candidates in unrealistic list positions will feel they were 
mainly nominated by the party to fulfil the quota requirements, which makes them less 
motivated to run expensive campaigns, even when compared with male candidates in 
comparable list positions. As mentioned earlier, this jeopardizes women's future political 
careers, as recent research on intra-party dynamics in flexible-list systems suggests that 
candidates with higher numbers of preferential votes are rewarded with better ballot list 
positions in future elections (Crisp et al. 2013). As women candidates spend less than their 
male counterparts, male dominated party selectorates will even have an 'objective' argument to 
deselect woman candidates or to favour male candidates for realistic list positions. Moreover, 
this is all the more problematic given the findings by Fulton (2012, 2013) that women, when 
controlling for political quality and valence, have to work harder than men to perform at parity 
with male politicians in the electoral arena. Finally, these new women candidates will mainly 
replace the less motivated male candidates, as the group of highly motivated and successful 
men are regarded as serious contenders by the party selectorate. This will broaden the gender 
gap in campaign spending even further in the short run. In sum, we assume that the spending 
differences between female and male candidates in unrealistic list positions will increase in the 
immediate aftermath of the introduction of quota regulations. 
 
With regard to realistic positions on candidate lists, however, we expect to see a substantially 
different pattern. The initially few female realistic candidates can be expected to be highly 
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motivated, not only because they feel more confident about their election chances but also 
because they feel more supported by the party elite. As a result, female candidates on realistic 
list positions will not be easily outspent by their male competitors, even immediately after the 
introduction of gender quotas. 
 
After a couple of elections, we expect the gender gap in campaign expenses among unrealistic 
candidates to decrease. Party elites will get used to the fact that a large proportion of their 
candidates are women, and women will increasingly become part of the party elite, which loses 
its predominantly male character. Women will consequently become more supported by party 
elites, increasing their chances of actually winning a seat in parliament. Moreover, personal 
successes of female candidates in previous elections and the growing number of female MPs 
in parliament will strengthen the belief of women in a successful parliamentary career and 
motivate them to run more expensive election campaigns.  
 
On the basis of these arguments we formulate two hypotheses. While H1 relates to candidates 
in unrealistic list positions, H2 concerns candidates in realistic list positions.  
 
H1. While the difference in campaign spending levels between female and male candidates in 
unrealistic list positions will increase immediately after the introduction of gender quotas, 
this difference will gradually decrease again over time. 
 
H2. There is no difference in campaign spending levels between female and male candidates 





Gender quotas and campaign spending in Belgium 
 
This article focuses on the case of the Belgian federal Lower House elections and the Flemish 
regional elections. For both types of elections a flexible-list electoral system applies, voters 
being able to endorse the party list as a whole or to cast one or more preferential votes for 
specific candidates.2 In theory, both the party provided rank order and the number of 
preferential votes play an important role in the intraparty seat allocation. In practice, however, 
the threshold of preferential votes to overcome the list order is reached very infrequently 
(Wauters and Weekers 2008). 
 
Gender quotas have been introduced for Belgian elections during the second half of the 1990s 
to increase the presence of women in parliaments (Meier 2012; Celis and Meier 2006). After 
the 1987 and 1991 Lower House elections, only 16 (7.5%) and 20 (9.4%) of the members of 
parliament were women. In 1994, this male dominated parliament approved a law on the more 
equal distribution of party list positions between men and women. In the 1999 parliamentary 
elections, the new quota regulations were imposed on the parties for the first time. The law 
stated that no more than two third of the candidates on a party list could be of the same sex.  
 
None of the clauses in the initial law involved the realistic positions on the list, which are of 
course of crucial importance in the Belgian flexible-list system (Celis and Meier 2006). As a 
result, the effect of these quotas on the composition of parliament was relatively limited at first: 
the number of elected women MPs only increased from 11.5% in 1995 to 19.3% in 1999. In 
                                                 
2 The only exception being the 1991 federal elections, where voters could endorse the party list as a 
whole or cast only one preferential vote for a specific candidate. 
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2002, the law became stricter in the sense that the number of female and male candidates on 
party lists had to be equal (a difference of one candidate allowed in the event of an uneven 
number of list positions). Moreover, at least one of the top three candidates had to be of 
different sex. These regulations were in place during the 2003 Lower House and 2004 regional 
elections. Before the 2007 elections, the quota regulations again slightly changed to impose 
gender parity in the top two positions on the list. Table 1 summarizes the Belgian quota 
regulations per election. 
 
< Table 1 about here > 
 
When it comes to campaign spending, Belgian candidates are limited by strict spending caps 
in their election campaigns (Maddens et al. 2017). Table 2 shows how Belgian party finance 
law determines spending caps for election candidates. As a general rule, all effective candidates 
and the first successor candidate are allowed to spend 5,000 euros during the official electoral 
campaign period, while all other successor candidates are subject to a spending limit of 2,500 
euros.3 Although these amounts seem relatively small, previous research on electoral 
campaigning in Belgium has shown that individual expenses significantly affect candidates’ 
electoral results (Maddens and Put 2013).  
 
< Table 2 about here > 
 
                                                 
3 Effective candidates are those who can be directly elected to parliament, on the basis of their individual 
preferential votes and/or their place on the list. Successor candidates are assigned to a separate and 
additional list. When an elected MP does not take the seat, becomes a minister, resigns or leaves the 
seat vacant due to illness or death, a successor candidate will take this seat, again based on preferential 
votes and/or place on the list. 
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Additionally, candidates in realistic list positions have higher spending caps. These are the first 
N candidates at the top of the party list in a constituency, where N equals the number of seats 
that particular list won in the previous election, plus one additional candidate. The number of 
realistic list positions thus varies across parties and party lists. These candidates are allowed to 
spend substantially higher amounts, in proportion to the number of voters in the constituency 
where they run for election. In the run-up to the 2014 elections, for instance, a realistic 
candidate for the Lower House in the constituency of Antwerp was allowed to spend 53,526 
euros.4  
 
Throughout the statistical analysis in this article, we apply the dichotomy between realistic and 
unrealistic list positions introduced by Hazan and Rahat (2010, 13-14). After all, Table 2 shows 
that the Belgian party finance law explicitly distinguishes a group of realistic candidates with 
a significantly higher chance of winning a seat, namely the N first candidates plus 1.  
 
Data and variables 
 
The empirical analysis in this article includes all the Flemish candidates of the six major parties 
for the seven Belgian Lower House elections and the five Flemish regional elections since 
                                                 
4 The extent to which candidates actually spend these amounts strongly varies between political parties. 
For instance, while candidates from smaller Belgian parties such as Agalev/Groen barely spend any 
campaign money at all, their counterparts from CD&V often spend between 80 and 90% of what is 
legally allowed  (Maddens et al. 2017). 
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1991.5 The analysis thus starts with the 1991 elections where no quota regulations were in place 
yet.  
 
The dependent variable is the total amount of campaign expenses, as declared by the candidates 
on their campaign expenses declaration after each election.6 We look at the relative campaign 
expenses by calculating the number of campaign expenses, expressed in eurocent, per 
registered voter in the electoral district. This operationalization is in line with research on other 
country cases such as Ireland (Benoit and Marsh 2010), Japan (Cox and Thies 2000), 
Switzerland (Engeli and Lutz 2014) and Belgium (Maddens and Put 2013). The dependent 
variable is semi-continuous: it has a right-skewed continuous distribution of non-negative 
values, but is at the same time characterized by a high proportion of zero values (Min and 
Agresti 2002). In this case, the point mass at zero refers to the candidates that did not spend 
anything for their campaign at all.7 We should consider these zeros as actual response outcomes 
and take them into account in our analysis. 
 
The key independent variables of this study are the sex of party candidates (dummy variable: 
1 = female; 0 = male) and list position (dummy variable: 1 = realistic candidate; 0 = unrealistic 
candidate). We also include the interaction between both variables to test our hypotheses on 
                                                 
5 These parties are: CVP/CD&V, PVV/VLD/OpenVld, SP/sp.a, Agalev/Groen, Vlaams Blok/Vlaams 
Belang and VU/N-VA. 
6 In order to make the expenses comparable across time, all amounts are recalculated in prices of 
December 2016, on the basis of the official Belgian consumer price index. 
7 Of all 10,436 observations in our dataset, 17.1% did not spend anything. These observations are mainly 
candidates of Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang and Agalev/Groen, which traditionally spend significantly 
less than those of other parties. 
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the gender gap in campaign spending among realistic versus unrealistic list positions. 
Moreover, it is also important to include the dummy variable for realistic list positions for 
another reason: the level of campaign spending strongly depends on the maximum amount that 
candidates are allowed to spend. As explained earlier, candidates in realistic positions enjoy 
higher spending caps, which allows them to outspend their lower ranked co-partisans and the 
majority of competitors on other party lists. Additionally, given their highly visible position on 
the list, these candidates have realistic chances of winning a seat, as a result of which they are 
arguably more motivated to run expensive campaigns. Since previous research shows that 
women are still underrepresented on upper list positions and male candidates are consequently 
more often allowed to spend the maximum amount (Celis and Meier 2006), we need to control 
for the effect of realistic positions. Identifying the group of realistic candidates with higher 
spending caps is relatively straightforward as these spending caps are reported on the campaign 
expenses declarations. 
 
We also control for the effect of other independent variables that expectedly affect levels of 
campaign spending by candidates. First, the incumbency status of candidates might affect 
spending behaviour in two opposite ways (Jacobson 1990). On the one hand, holding 
parliamentary or executive office may reduce the need for politicians to invest heavily in 
campaigns, since incumbents are already better known to the average voter as their office 
provided them with more visibility. On the other hand, incumbents can generally rely on 
extensive political and campaign networks and more financial means than their competitors, 
which might have a positive effect on campaign expenses.  
 
Additionally, we include age (continuous) and profession (categorical variable with seven 
responses) in the model, which both affect campaign expenses according to previous research 
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(Maddens and Put 2013). By including profession, we can moreover control for the fact that 
women candidates are more often than men unemployed (e.g. being a housewife or being 
retired), hence having less financial resources at their disposal to wage an expensive campaign 
(Charles 2011). In addition, profession can also be considered a proxy for the social and 
political network of candidates, and therefore their electoral attractiveness for party selectorates 
(Cairney 2007). Political party (categorical variable with five responses) is also controlled for, 
as earlier studies on campaign spending show considerable differences between Belgian parties 
in terms of campaign spending cultures (Maddens et al. 2017). 
 
Next, we include type of election (dummy variable: 1 = Lower House election; 0 = Flemish 
Parliament election) in the model, since previous research suggests that candidates tend to 
spend more for regional elections (Maddens et al. 2017).8 To conclude, we control for district 
magnitude (number of seats in the district) as it is a proxy for the scale of electoral competition 
taking place in the district. The lower the number of seats to be distributed, the more the district 
will resemble single member district systems which tightens competition and incentivizes 
candidates to spend more. Moreover, larger districts will enable candidates to achieve 




                                                 
8 For multiple reasons, we do not expect to see significant differences in terms of gender inequality 
between federal and regional elections. First, parties competing with each other on both levels are 
exactly the same, and second, the fairly high degree of level-hopping in the Belgian political arena 
indicates that politicians themselves rate the federal and regional level as relatively equal 
(Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put 2013). 
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We first calculated the percentage of women among realistic and unrealistic candidates 
between 1991 and 2014. Figure 1 shows that, notwithstanding the introduction of gender quotas 
for Belgian elections, women are still systematically underrepresented in realistic positions. 
While the percentage of women among realistic candidates has clearly increased since 1991, 
there is still no perfect gender parity as female candidates make out only about 40% among 
this group. Although gender quotas force Belgian parties to nominate an equal amount of 
female and male candidates on each party list and oblige them to put a woman on one of the 
first three/two positions since 2003 (see Table 1), this did not translate into full gender equality 
with regard to the realistic list positions. Recently, Marien, Schouteden, and Wauters (2017) 
reported similar findings for the Belgian 2012 local elections, where the top of the list remained 
male-dominated (80% of lists has male candidate on first position) even though identical quota 
regulations were in place. 
< Figure 1 about here> 
 
What effect does this have on the campaign spending behaviour of female and male candidates 
in Belgian elections? Figure 2 shows the mean campaign expenses (expressed in eurocent per 
registered voter) of the candidates by election year and sex for the Lower House and the 
Flemish Parliament separately. More specifically, while the upper panels (a and b) display the 
results for realistic candidates, the bottom panels (c and d) focus on candidates in the other list 
positions.9 The graphs illustrate that male candidates initially outspent their female colleagues, 
yet that the difference decreased in recent years. 
                                                 
9 The reported gender differences in campaign spending cannot be reduced to unequal financial support 
for candidates by political parties themselves. On the contrary, the share of party financial support in 
the individual campaigns of female candidates is on average 5% higher, which confirms that reported 
differences reflect women being less inclined to invest personal resources into their campaigns than 
their male counterparts (Maddens et al. 2017). 
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< Figure 2 about here > 
 
Panels a and b of Figure 2 show that a clear gender gap in campaign spending can be found 
within the group of realistic candidates until the 2003 (federal) and the 2004 (regional) 
elections. From then onwards, when the most strict quota regulations came in place, spending 
levels for both sexes have converged, especially because women started to spend more. But 
while the difference in campaign spending levels between female and male realistic candidates 
simply disappeared for the federal Lower House elections, female realistic candidates for the 
Flemish regional elections now even wage more expensive campaigns than their male 
counterparts. 
 
With regard to candidates in the lower list positions (panels c and d), women were only outspent 
in the earliest elections when no gender quota applied yet. From the 1999 elections onwards, 
this gender gap largely disappeared: for both the Lower House and the Flemish regional 
elections, there has been a gentle decrease in the gender gap during the most recent elections, 
to such an extent that women and men now invest equally in their election campaigns. 
 
The graphs show that the relationship between gender and campaign spending in Belgium has 
changed over time, as the gender quotas became stricter. In general, this seems to contradict 
our hypotheses: we did not expect a gender gap among realistic candidates and assumed the 
gender gap among unrealistic candidates to increase immediately after the introduction of 
quota. None of these expectations are reflected in the figure. But it is only by means of a 
multivariate analysis that we will be able to test whether the reported differences in campaign 
spending are actually related to gender as such, or instead to other background characteristics 
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of candidates that correlate to the sex of parliamentary candidates, such as incumbency, age or 
occupation.  
 
As our dependent variable is semi-continuous, we cannot run simple linear regression models. 
An alternative approach to analyse these data is to run a generalized linear model with a 
Tweedie distribution (Parveen, Mullah, and Ahshanullah 2016). Table 3 shows the results of 
four separate generalized linear models.10 Each of the models mark a different phase in Belgian 
quota regulations (years are shown in the table).  
 
< Table 3 about here > 
 
The results show that initially, when no quota regulations were in place yet (1991-1995), 
female candidates were significantly outspent by their male counterparts. Realistic candidates 
self-evidently outspent their competitors in unrealistic positions. The interaction effect between 
sex and realistic candidate does not have a significant effect on spending, which implies there 
is no additional spending disparity among the highest ranked candidates.  
 
                                                 
10 We also considered presenting a pooled model with a dummy for each gender quota phase in 
Belgium. Testing the hypotheses implies entering three-way interaction terms between sex, realistic 
candidate and the gender quota phases. As this would substantially complicate interpretation and 
discussion of our empirical findings, we present separate models for each of the quota phases. In the 
pooled model, however, we also find that the main term of sex is statistically significant and the 




In 1999, during the first election after the introduction of gender quotas in Belgium, we no 
longer find a significant difference between female and male candidates regarding their 
campaign expenses. This contradicts the first hypothesis, which stated that the first election 
with quotas would show an immediate increase of the difference between female and male 
unrealistic candidates. On the contrary, the initially found difference disappears after the 
introduction of quota legislation, for realistic candidates as well as other candidates. The fact 
that the 1999 elections did not produce an increase of the difference between men and women 
may first of all point to the fact that gender quotas in this phase were not ambitious, but rather 
institutionalized an already existing situation: Belgian parties were only required to nominate 
women candidates for one third of their list positions, a relatively moderate threshold which 
they already reached in the 1995 Lower House election where 32% of all parliamentary 
candidates were women. The parties thus not yet had to look for a large group of new (and less 
motivated) female candidates, which could have broadened the gender gap.  
 
In the second phase of quota regulations (2003-2004), when parties were obliged to nominate 
female candidates for half of the list positions and to have at least one female candidate in one 
of the three top list positions, we again detect a significant spending disparity among male and 
female candidates. While the interaction term between sex and realistic candidate does not 
reach significance levels, this does not automatically mean that there are no significant gender 
differences among realistic candidates (see: Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). We calculated 
the marginal effect of sex among top candidates for this model (2003-2004), and found that the 
sex of a candidate does make a significant difference among realistic candidates (β=-0.2498, 
se=0.0612, significant at the α=0.001 level). Differences in spending behaviour between female 
and male candidates thus emerge again as the Belgian gender quotas became stricter since 
2003. These stricter regulations apparently led to the influx of new and often unexperienced 
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women candidates, who generally had lower campaign spending levels than their male 
colleagues. Although realistic candidates are in attractive list positions and hence have realistic  
chances of winning a seat, we nevertheless find that female candidates in realistic list positions 
are characterized by lower spending levels than their male counterparts. 
 
The model for the third phase of quota regulations (2007-2014) does not produce 
fundamentally different results for unrealistic candidates, where we still find a significant 
difference in spending levels between female and male candidates. As a consequence, the 
results seem to be at odds with the first hypothesis, as we expected the gender gap to decrease 
over time among unrealistic candidates. Among realistic candidates, the significant difference 
disappears again: since the 2007 parliamentary elections in Belgium, female realistic 
candidates again reached spending levels comparable to their male competitors. Thus, contrary 
to what we expected, a gender gap shortly existed among realistic candidates as well, in 
particular during the second phase of quota regulations (2003-2004), but this difference 
disappeared over the course of the elections. 
 
A possible explanation for this latter finding is the lack of seniority among women candidates 
in realistic list positions. It is only from 2003 onwards that party selectorates were required to 
assign more female candidates to attractive list positions. These women had significantly less 
political and campaign experience, and arguably did not have the resources to match the 
expenses by their male competitors. After a couple of elections, the effect of candidate seniority 
presumably faded, as these women were nominated by the party selectorate time and again and 




In sum, the findings based on multivariate models do not fully support our hypotheses. With 
regard to the first hypothesis, we find that female unrealistic candidates have always been 
outspent by male candidates, apart from the first election with (rather limited) gender quotas. 
This gender gap did not disappear over time. Among unrealistic candidates, the introduction of 
gender quota has thus not closed the gender gap in campaign spending. The results regarding 
realistic candidates were not entirely in line with our second hypothesis either: while we 
expected no significant difference in spending between men and women among these 
candidates, we did find elections where sex has a significant marginal effect on spending 
among realistic candidates. These findings are nevertheless more hopeful: in the long run it 





This article analysed how the introduction of gender quotas affected the level of campaign 
spending of female and male parliamentary candidates in Belgium's flexible-list system. We 
particularly examined the existence of a gender gap in campaign spending and whether this 
inequality was related to the stepwise introduction of quota laws. Given the importance of list 
order in the flexible-list system, the analysis distinguished between gender inequality in 
campaign spending among candidates in realistic and unrealistic list positions.  
 
The results of our analysis reveal that the effects of gender quotas on campaign spending are 
not straightforward. While the levels of campaign expenses of female and male candidates were 
significantly different from one another when no quotas applied yet (1991-1995), this 
difference disappeared during the first phase of quota regulations (1999). Arguably, this is 
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explained by the rather unambitious nature of the first gender quotas in Belgium, which actually 
formalized an already existing situation in terms of list positions yet at the same time motivated 
female candidates to increase campaign expenses. In the second (2003-2004) and third (2007-
2014) phase, gender quotas became more severe as a result of which party selectorates had to 
seek for new women candidates for their lists and a gender difference in campaign spending 
arose again. 
 
For candidates in realistic list positions, we hypothesized that the gender gap in campaign 
spending would not exist for top candidates. We did, however, find evidence for such 
differences in the 2003-2004 elections. After a couple of elections, however, the gap between 
men and women closed again, presumably because female candidates accumulated seniority 
and capital. Contrary to unrealistic candidates, female realistic candidates have thus been able 
to catch up financially with their male counterparts. 
 
In sum, in the first phase of quota laws, there was no gender gap in campaign spending, for top 
candidates nor for all others. In the second phase, a gender gap appeared again for all 
candidates, in the sense that women spent significantly less than men. In the third and last 
phase, this gender gap disappeared, but only for realistic candidates. This illustrates that the 
party elites bear, at least partly, responsibility for the gender gap in campaign spending. The 
(motivated) female candidates in realistic positions clearly measure up to their male 
counterparts, but as we have shown, women are still underrepresented in these positions. The 
parties could therefore help to close this gap by selecting more female candidates for realistic 
list positions. The limited number of women assigned to realistic positions reveals an ongoing 
reluctance of party elites to equally support women in the electoral process. This elite bias 




What should other flexible-list PR systems in Europe learn from the Belgian experience in 
introducing legislative gender quotas? Within the group of Western European countries that 
apply the flexible-list PR system, Belgium is a country case with one of the strictest forms of 
quota regulations. Other flexible-list PR cases such as Austria, Czech Republic, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden all have no legislative quotas but have political parties 
which adopted voluntary quota rules.11 Self-evidently, the Belgian system of legislative quotas 
is more far-reaching and more substantially intervenes in the intra-party candidate selection 
processes.  
 
Still, the Belgian experience shows that legislative quotas are no guarantee of full gender 
equality in list positions and campaign spending behavior. We believe, however, that the 
persistence of gender inequality is related to the unwillingness of predominantly male party 
and parliamentary elites to drastically reform candidate selection rules in disfavour of male 
candidates. This was of course reflected in the stepwise introduction of the legislative quotas 
system in Belgium, starting off with a first phase (i.e. 1999 elections) with relatively 
unambitious regulations. The importance of list positions in the flexible-list PR system requires 
the implementation of legislative quotas with specific rules for realistic list positions from the 
very start. In our analysis, a gender gap among realistic candidates was detected in the second 
phase of the legislative quota regulations, which disappeared during the last – and most 
stringent – phase. Among unrealistic candidates, a significant difference between male and 
female candidates persists. These results suggest that other flexible-list PR systems considering 
the introduction of legislative gender quotas should immediately impose strict rules on party 
selectorates for realistic list positions. Any type of provisional phase with voluntary rules will 
                                                 
11 For an overview, see: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas . 
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